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AN INTRODUCTION TO INTRAGROUP DISSENT                          
AND ITS LEGAL IMPLICATIONS 
HOLNING LAU†
Law and legal advocacy have long been tied to strongly held notions 
of group identity. Lawyers purport to represent social groups such as 
LGBT people, communities of color, and different religious groups.1 This 
advocacy both reflects and reinforces the social construction of group iden-
tities. Similarly, commentators around the world have sought to shape law 
by invoking group values. For example, commentators have argued that 
law in Asia must be developed to comport with so-called “Asian values” 
that are distinguishable from values in the West.2 By framing arguments 
this way, commentators entrench thinking in terms of disparate cultural 
groups. In addition, certain legal protections foster the preservation and de-
velopment of group identity. These doctrines range from the freedom of as-
sociation in United States constitutional law to cultural rights under inter-
national human rights law.3
Despite the common treatment of social groups as cohesive entities, 
groups often experience internal discord. Group members disagree on how 
to define their group’s core values, goals, and advocacy strategies. These 
dynamics raise a series of questions: To what extent do group-based legal 
frameworks make space for internal disagreements? How has dissent with-
 1.  See generally CAUSE LAWYERS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS (Austin Sarat & Stuart A. 
Scheingold, eds., 2006) (discussing the role of lawyers in social movements). The term “LGBT people” 
refers to lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender persons. 
 2.  See Yash Ghai, Understanding Human Rights in Asia, in HUMAN RIGHTS: SOUTHERN VOICES
120 (William Twining ed., 2009) (explaining that “Asian values” have been invoked as a reason for 
rejecting certain rights claims); cf. also Alexis Okeowo, Out in Africa, NEW YORKER, Dec. 24, 2012, at 
64 (“Anti-gay advocates [in Uganda] claim that they are defending “African values”). 
 3.  E.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the Limited Public 
Forum: Unconstitutional Conditions on “Equal Access” for Religious Speakers and Groups, 29 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 653, 291 (1996) (“Where a group seeks to maintain a distinctive identity based on 
shared ideological commitments and operates wholly or primarily in a noncommercial context, the First 
Amendment [Freedom of Association] requires that the group be free to make adherence to the purpos-
es and positions of the group a condition of membership.” (italics omitted)); International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, art. 27, Dec. 16, 1966, 6 I.L.M. 368, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (1967) (“In those 
States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall 
not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, 
to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language.”). 
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in groups been treated by legal advocates, lawmakers, and commentators? 
How should intragroup dissent be addressed going forward? 
On November 8, 2013, the Chicago-Kent Law Review convened a 
symposium to explore these questions about intragroup dissent. Scott 
Cummings delivered a keynote address and eight speakers presented pa-
pers, six of which are published in this issue. The symposium produced a 
lively and illuminating discussion. It was a pleasure for me to participate in 
the symposium, and I am delighted to introduce this issue of the Law Re-
view.
In this essay, I provide some context by introducing earlier writings 
that have informed thinking about social groups and intragroup dissent over 
the years. I then provide a sketch of this issue’s contents, highlighting the 
ways that this symposium builds on existing literature and takes discus-
sions about intragroup dissent to new frontiers. 
I. PRIMER ON GROUPS AND DISSENT
It is widely understood that groups matter. In advocacy, collective 
identity and group solidary are tools for effectuating change because there 
is power in numbers.4 By forming a united front, group members can 
launch a stronger political campaign. In litigation, coming together in a 
class action lawsuit might achieve results that an individual plaintiff could 
not.5
Beyond the power that adheres to groups, groups matter because be-
longing to social groups contributes to people’s sense of self.6 As Peter 
 4.  See, e.g., Maxine Eichner, On Postmodern Feminist Legal Theory, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L.
REV. 1, 46 (2001)  (“Social scientists have demonstrated that, in order to perceive discrimination and to 
imagine changing the status quo, individuals need collective identities.”); Lani Guinier, The Triumph of 
Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act and the Theory of Black Electoral Success, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1077 
(1991) (discussing the significance of group solidarity to the black civil rights movement); Arthur Mil-
ler et al., Group Consciousness and Political Participation, 25 AM. J. POL. SCI. 494, 509 (1981) (“with-
out the mobilizing influence of group consciousness[,]” disadvantaged populations “would clearly par-
ticipate [in politics] at significantly lower rates.”). 
 5.  See Beth Van Schaack, Unfulfilled Promise: The Human Rights Class Action, 2003 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 279, 306–28 (2003) (discussing the advantages and disadvantages of class actions in human 
rights advocacy); Deborah Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1183, 1186-1202 
(1982) (summarizing reasons why “[f]or those seeking structural reforms, class actions afford a number 
of obvious advantages over suits involving individual plaintiffs,” and then providing a taxonomy of 
disagreements among class action plaintiffs). 
 6.  I have elaborated on this point previously in Holning Lau, Transcending the Individualist 
Paradigm in Sexual Orientation Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1271, 2181-84 (2006). For 
social psychology literature on the relationship between group membership and identity, see e.g., Jan E. 
Stets & Peter J. Burke, Identity Theory and Social Identity Theory, 63 SOC. PSYCH. Q. 224, 226 (2000). 
On the relationship between group rights and group members’ sense of self, see e.g., CAROL C. GOULD,
GLOBALIZING DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 119-21 (2004); WILL KYMLICKA, LIBERALISM,
COMMUNITY AND CULTURE 169 (1989). 
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Jones put it: “[S]ome of what is fundamentally important for people relates 
to identities that they can possess and to practices in which they can engage 
only in association with others.”7 Thus, if we are to honor people’s ability 
to develop their sense of self, we must recognize that social groups play an 
important part of that process. For example, if deciding to participate in re-
ligious ceremonies with other worshippers is important to an individual’s 
self-definition, that individual’s sense of self is contingent on belonging to 
a group with fellow worshippers. 
Of course, groups contribute to people’s sense of self to varying de-
grees. Most of the articles in this symposium focus on what could be called 
“identity groups.” Individuals derive a sense of identity by claiming mem-
bership in these social groups.8 For example, racial, ethnic, and religious 
groups are identity groups because these groups frequently play a role in 
shaping people’s self-concept.9 To be sure, not all individuals feel a strong 
sense of membership in racial, ethnic, and religious groups, but these 
groups have been socially constructed in such a way that they are often sa-
lient to people’s identity.10 Other social groups may have much weaker 
connections to identity. Consider a case where neighbors team up to chal-
lenge a proposed construction project in their neighborhood. This group of 
neighbors may share a common goal and experience a sense of solidarity, 
but their membership in the protest group may only inform their sense of 
identity in a very limited or provisional sense. Once the campaign against 
construction ends, the group identity may lose significance. 
Groups are not always cohesive entities. Internal fissures often pit in-
ternal dissenters against the rest of the group. Members of the same church 
might disagree about how to interpret religious doctrine. Members of the 
same racial justice movement might disagree on how to prioritize advocacy 
goals. Even if everyone agrees on the same set of priorities, they may disa-
 7.  Peter Jones, Group Rights and Group Oppression, 7 J. POL. PHIL. 353, 353 (1999). 
 8.  Cf. Mark Kelman, Market Discrimination and Groups, 53 STAN. L. REV. 833, 837-38 (2001) 
(distinguishing between groups “conventionally thought of as ‘social identity groups’ and what might 
be called mere statistical aggregates, ‘groups’ with identifiable common characteristics that lack a cul-
ture or self-conscious socio-political identity”). 
 9.  Cf. Anthony V. Alfieri & Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Next-Generation Civil Rights Lawyers: 
Race and Representation in the Age of Identity Performance, 122 YALE L.J. 1484, 1520 (2013) (noting 
the existence of disenfranchised identity groups based on race, religion, sexual orientation, and immi-
gration status). 
 10.  See Natasha J. Silber, Note, Unscrambling the Egg: Social Constructionism and the Antireifi-
cation Principle in Constitutional Law, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1873, 1879-82 (2013) (providing a primer on 
social constructionism); Kenneth L. Karst, Myths of Identity: Individual and Group Portraits of Race 
and Sexual Orientation, 43 UCLA L. REV. 263, 282–89 (1995) (contending that identity categories and 
their salience are a “matter of social convention,” presenting race and sexual orientation as examples). 
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gree about what constitutes the best strategy for achieving their shared 
goals.
As noted just above, social collectives serve important functions. Yet, 
dissent within collectives is important as well. Indeed, a growing literature 
develops normative support for intragroup dissenters. For readers who are 
new to the topic of intragroup dissent and wish to read beyond this sympo-
sium, I would recommend Madhavi Sunder’s writing on “cultural dissent” 
as a starting point.11 Professor Sunder’s writing illuminates the value of al-
lowing members of a cultural group to stay in the group and contest the 
group’s dominant mode of thinking. To value such dissent is to value the 
“autonomy, choice, and reason” among group members.12 Professor Sunder 
also argues that cultural dissenters play an important role in helping cultur-
al groups to evolve.13 In her writing on “cultural dissent,” Professor Sunder 
adopts a capacious definition of “cultural” that includes religious culture. 
For example, she has argued that feminist Muslims who challenge domi-
nant interpretations of Islam ought to be protected against retaliation from 
other members of their religious communities.14
Dissent within a group can fall along various lines that cannot all be 
addressed in this brief introduction. I would be remiss, however, if I did not 
highlight intersectionality as an analytical lens for viewing the lines along 
which dissent forms. “Intersectionality” is a term popularized by Kimberlé 
Crenshaw in her groundbreaking work.15 Professor Crenshaw and her peers 
demonstrated that different dimensions of identity intersect to produce dis-
agreement between subgroups. For example, examining the intersection of 
race and sex, scholars have contrasted the views commonly held by white 
women with the views commonly held by women of color.16 There is now 
 11.  See Madhavi Sunder, Piercing the Veil, 112 YALE L.J. 1399, 1408-10 (2003) [hereinafter 
Sunder, Piercing the Veil]; Madhavi Sunder, Cultural Dissent, 54 STAN. L. REV. 495 (2001) [hereinaf-
ter Sunder, Cultural Dissent].
 12.  Sunder, Cultural Dissent, supra note 11, at 495. 
 13.  Id.
 14.  E.g., Sunder, Piercing the Veil, supra note 11, at 1434-43. 
 15.  See Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Gender, and Sexual Harassment, 65 S. CAL. L. REV.
1467 (1992) [hereinafter Crenshaw, Race]; Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Inter-
sectionality, Identity Politics and Violence against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241 (1991)
[hereinafter Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins]; Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the In-
tersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory 
and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139 (1989) [hereinafter Crenshaw, Demarginalization]. 
Around the same time that Professor Crenshaw began publishing about intersectionality, Angela Harris 
was making similar arguments without using the term “intersectionality.” See Angela P. Harris, Race 
and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990). 
 16.  E.g., Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex, supra note 15, at 152-60; 
Harris, supra note 15, at 608-16. 
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a large corpus of writing that examines intragroup conflicts through the 
lens of intersectionality.17
II. IMPLICATIONS FOR LAWYERING, LAW, AND LEGAL COMMENTARY
Intragroup dissent has implications for legal advocacy and doctrine, as 
well as for legal commentary such as law review literature. With respect to 
advocacy, social movement lawyers play a role in mediating intragroup 
disagreement about goals and strategies. The scholarship that has explored 
this role for lawyers includes seminal texts such as Derrick Bell’s writing 
on the NAACP and William Rubenstein’s writing about LGBT rights ad-
vocacy.18
Consider the LGBT rights movement as an illustration. There has long 
been debate among LGBT people about whether to prioritize marriage 
equality over other advocacy goals.19 Lawyers at LGBT rights organiza-
tions are part of that debate, having to decide how much time and money to 
devote to marriage equality, as opposed to issues such as employment dis-
crimination or transgender health care. 
Even if we were to assume for argument’s sake that there is consensus 
about making marriage equality the main goal, lawyers would still need to 
manage disagreements about legal strategies for reaching that goal. To be 
sure, disagreements about legal strategies occur beyond the context of 
groups. There certainly may be disagreement among lawyers representing 
an individual client who is not part of a larger movement. However, disa-
greements about litigation strategy can be particularly difficult when they 
arise within groups that prize solidarity.20
 17.  See, e.g., Alfieri & Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 9, at 1517-22 (positing that civil rights at-
torneys have become more attuned to intragroup disagreements that emerge from intersectionality); 
Frank Rudy Cooper, Who’s the Man?: Masculinities Studies, Terry Stops, and Police Training, 18 
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 671, 725-26 (2009) (examining tension among male subgroups); Catherine 
Smith, Queer as Black Folk, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 379, 390-91 (2007) (contending that people of color’s 
perspectives are marginalized in predominantly white LGBT institutions, including advocacy organiza-
tions).
 18.  Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School 
Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976); William B. Rubenstein, Divided We Litigate: Ad-
dressing Disputes Among Group Members and Lawyers in Civil Rights Campaigns, 106 YALE. L.J. 
1623 (1997). 
 19.  For an examination of this debate, see e.g., Edward Stein, Marriage or Liberation?: Reflec-
tions on Two Strategies in the Struggle for Lesbian and Gay Rights and Relationship Recognition, 61 
RUTGERS L. REV. 567, 592 (2009). 
 20.  For example, Edward Stein’s contribution to this symposium considers a particularly heated 
intragroup debate about advocacy strategy. He examines disagreement about whether gay rights advo-
cates should argue that sexual orientation is inborn and unchangeable. See Edward Stein, Immutability
and Innateness Arguments About Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Rights, 89 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 597, 597 
(2014). 
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Intragroup dissent is also relevant to lawyering in a different way. In-
stead of mediating intragroup dissent, lawyers may actually want to facili-
tate intragroup dissent. To understand this point, consider LGBT rights in 
the global context. Some governments have rejected LGBT rights as a for-
eign, Western concept.21 They contend that human rights activists engage 
in cultural imperialism when they insist that countries outside of the West 
protect LGBT rights. To counter these claims, lawyers may wish to strate-
gically couple any arguments based on international human rights princi-
ples with arguments that are based specifically on local group culture.22 In 
other words, advocates can challenge the idea that LGBT rights are a for-
eign import by framing the debate about LGBT rights as a disagreement 
among local community members who hold competing interpretations of 
local culture.23 In this way, intragroup dissent functions as a strategic fram-
ing device. 
Intragroup dissent also influences how we think about legal doctrine. 
Some legal rights are clearly intended to facilitate the development and 
preservation of group identity. In the United States, the First Amendment’s 
protection of freedom of association serves this function. Focusing on in-
tragroup dissent prompts questions about how to balance the protection of 
freedom of association against protections for intragroup dissent. Does the 
freedom of association permit groups to expel dissenters within the group? 
Drawing on the case of Dale v. Boy Scouts of America,24 in which the 
Scouts expelled a troop leader for being openly gay, Professor Sunder has 
argued that the Supreme Court jurisprudence construes freedom of associa-
tion too broadly, allowing group leaders to stifle intragroup dissent.25 In a 
similar vein, commentators have criticized additional legal doctrines for sti-
fling dissent with groups; these disparate legal areas range from the protec-
 21.  See, Okeowo, supra note 2, at 64 (discussing the case of Uganda); Eric Heinze, Sexual Orien-
tation and International Law: A Study in the Manufacture of Cross-Cultural “Sensitivity,” 22 MICH. J.
INT’L L. 283, 306-07 (2001) (explaining that some political leaders opposed gay rights by calling them 
“un-Asian”). For my previous writings on point, see Holning Lau, The Language of Westernization in 
Legal Commentary, 61 AM. J. COMP. L. 507, 532 (2013) [hereinafter Lau, Westernization]; Holning 
Lau, Grounding Conversations on Sexuality and Asian Law, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 773, 786-90 (2011) 
(hereinafter Lau, Grounding Conversations].
 22.  Cf. Carl F. Stychin, Same-Sex Sexualities and the Globalization of Human Rights Discourse,
49 MCGILL L.J. 951, 954 (2004) (examining ways that advocates for sexual orientation rights have 
“move[d] seamlessly between discourses of the local and the global”). 
 23.  See Stewart Chang, The Postcolonial Problem for Global Gay Rights, 32 B.U. INT’L L.J. 
(forthcoming 2014) (examining gay rights advocacy in Singapore and exploring the benefits of ground-
ing claims in local Asian culture). 
 24.  Dale v. Boy Scouts of America, 530 U.S. 640 (2000). 
 25.  Sunder, Cultural Dissent, supra note 11, at 523-48. 
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tion of cultural property in the United States to marriage laws in Africa.26
These scholarly defenses of intragroup dissent have given us good reason 
to ponder how to balance group-based rights with the rights of individual 
group members to freely express their dissent without forfeiting group 
membership. 
Finally, beyond advocacy and legal doctrine, a consciousness of in-
tragroup dissent should inform legal commentary generally. Awareness of 
intragroup dissent raises questions about how we communicate in legal 
commentary, including in law review pages. Do we too often make sweep-
ing claims about social groups, treating them as monolithic entities, thus 
obscuring intragroup dissent? In my own recent analysis of law review lit-
erature, I concluded that authors all too often write about non-Western 
parts of the world in reductionist ways that mask dissent within non-
Western cultural groups.27 Indeed, one goal of this symposium is to expand 
consciousness of intragroup dissent so that legal commentators can become 
better attuned to its dynamics and account for intragroup dissent in writing. 
III. EXPANDING OUR UNDERSTANDING
This symposium issue advances the exploration of intragroup dissent 
on numerous fronts. Several contributors elaborate on the role of lawyers in 
managing intragroup dissent. Others examine how legal doctrines regulate 
intragroup dissent. Two other contributors provide new analytical struc-
tures for understanding intragroup dissent by developing taxonomies of 
dissenters. 
Scott Cummings’ keynote remarks follow this introductory essay.28
Building on his earlier works,29 Professor Cummings examines the rela-
tionship between intragroup dissent and two models of cause lawyering: 
“top-down” impact litigation and “bottom-up” grassroots campaigns. The 
conventional wisdom has been that the top-down approach threatens to sti-
 26.  E.g., Johanna E. Bond, Culture, Dissent, and the State: The Example of Commonwealth Afri-
can Marriage Law, 14 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1, 37 (2011) (arguing for the protection of cultural 
dissenters by maintaining statutory regulation of marriage alongside African customary law); Naomi 
Mezey, The Paradoxes of Cultural Property, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 2004, 2007-18 (2007) (critiquing the 
idea of “cultural property” in international law and in domestic law of the United States). 
 27.  See generally Lau, The Language of Westernization, supra note 21. 
 28.  See Scott L. Cummings, How Lawyers Manage Intragroup Dissent, 89 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
547 (2014). 
 29.  Scott L. Cummings, The Accountability Problem in Public Interest Practice: Old Paradigms and 
New Directions, in LAWYERS IN PRACTICE: ETHICAL DECISION MAKING IN CONTEXT 340-364 (2012); Scott L. 
Cummings & Douglas Nejaime, Lawyering for Marriage Equality, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1235 (2010); Scott L. 
Cummings, Law in the Labor Movement’s Challenge to Wal-Mart: A Case Study of the Inglewood Site Fight, 95 
CAL. L. REV. 1927 (2007). 
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fle intragroup dissent while the bottom-up approach makes room for dis-
senters. Professor Cummings challenges this conventional wisdom by pre-
senting case studies of the marriage equality movement and the Los Ange-
les labor movement. 
Like Professor Cummings, Kathryn Sabbeth focuses on the role of 
lawyers.30 She observes that capital defense litigation in the American 
South has been performed largely, and at one point almost entirely, by law-
yers from the North. These capital defenders are met with resistance be-
cause they are perceived as “outsiders” who seek to impose a foreign agen-
da on local Southern communities. Professor Sabbeth explains that lawyers 
should respond to this resistance by retooling their campaigns to emphasize 
internal dissent within the South. Her article highlights ways for advocates 
to clarify that Northern attorneys are not imposing outside values, but are 
instead empowering local death penalty opponents whose views can be 
grounded in local moral traditions. Professor Sabbeth’s article shows that it 
can be helpful to frame advocacy around intragroup dissent.31
Edward Stein examines the role of lawyers in ongoing debate about 
whether sexual orientation is inborn and unchangeable.32 LGB communi-
ties commonly argue that LGB people are “born that way” and that sexual 
orientation is “not a choice.”33 Outrage is often directed at LGB people 
who question this conventional wisdom. Professor Stein’s article lends 
support to these dissenting voices within LGB communities. He critiques 
the conventional etiological arguments from ethical, bioethical, and prag-
matic perspectives. Based on this critique, he charts a course for LGB 
rights advocates, a course that doesn’t completely jettison etiological ar-
guments, but limits the arguments substantially. 
Asma Uddin’s symposium contribution examines both legal doctrine 
and lawyering.34 Her article shows how Muslim-majority countries often 
use blasphemy laws, apostasy laws, and other legal regulations to persecute 
Muslim individuals who challenge dominant interpretations of Islam. Be-
yond documenting this stifling of intra-Muslim dissent, Ms. Uddin explores 
paths for reform. She contends that the Qur’an and Islamic tradition can, 
 30.  See Kathryn A. Sabbeth, Capital Defenders as Outside Lawyers, 89 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 569
(2014). 
 31.  See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text (discussing the value of emphasizing in-
tragroup dissent in advocacy). 
 32.  See Stein, supra note 20, at 597. 
 33.  Professor Stein uses the acronym “LGB” to refer specifically to lesbian, gay, and bisexual 
people. Because his article does not address transgender issues, the piece generally refers to LGB peo-
ple, as opposed to LGBT people. Id. at 597 n.1. 
 34.  See Asma T. Uddin, Intragroup Discourse on Intragroup Protections in Muslim-Majority 
Countries, 89 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 641 (2014). 
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and should, be interpreted to respect religious freedom. Moreover, she ar-
gues that arguments based on Islamic thought will be more persuasive than 
arguments stemming from other origins such as international human rights 
law. “If the concept of religious freedom is to truly take root within tradi-
tional Muslim societies, it must be expressed in Muslim terms and argued 
from a Muslim perspective based on traditional Islamic texts.”35 Like Pro-
fessor Sabbeth’s contribution on the American South, Ms. Uddin’s article 
argues in favor of centering advocacy around intragroup dialog and debate. 
Lourdes Peroni continues this symposium’s discussion on religion, but 
shifts the focus to the European Court of Human Rights.36 She explains 
that, at times, the Court’s jurisprudence has “obscure[d] and discourage[d] 
diversity within religious groups” by refusing to protect the religious free-
dom of individuals who practice their religions in unorthodox ways.37 Ms. 
Peroni argues that the Court should adopt “relatively porous filters” for de-
termining what counts as religious practice, recognizing that individuals 
who identify with the same religious group may practice their religion in 
different ways. Put differently, Ms. Peroni argues for the protection of reli-
gious individuals who dissent from religious orthodoxy. 
The last two symposium articles help us to understand intragroup dis-
sent by offering new taxonomical frameworks of dissent. Kareem Crayton 
turns his attention to racial dissent among African Americans.38 As Profes-
sor Crayton notes, African Americans have generally placed great value on 
racial solidary in politics. Thus, African Americans who openly criticize 
Barack Obama, our country’s first black president, have been viewed as ra-
cial dissenters. Professor Crayton contends that these racial dissenters fall 
into three categories: “public dissenter,” “official dissenter,” and “partisan 
dissenter.” He argues that distinguishing among racial dissenters in this 
way helps to clarify their different political implications. 
Finally, Nancy Leong’s article builds on her earlier writing on the 
commodification of identity.39 She explains that members of outgroups 
(e.g., people of color, women, and gays) can derive value from their identi-
ties by publicly portraying themselves as outgroup members who distance 
themselves from the rest of their group. Professor Leong argues, however, 
 35.  Id. at 658. 
 36.  See Lourdes Peroni, The European Court of Human Rights and Intragroup Religious Diversi-
ty: A Critical Review, 89 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 663 (2014). 
 37.  Id. at 665. 
 38.  See Kareem U. Crayton, The Art of Racial Dissent: African American Political Discourse in 
the Age of Obama, 89 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 689 (2014). 
 39.  See Nancy Leong, Dissenting In and Dissenting Out, 89 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 723 (2014). For 
Prof. Leong’s earlier writing on this topic, see Nancy Leong, Racial Capitalism, 126 HARV. L. REV.
2151 (2013). 
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that we should distinguish between two types of outgroup dissenters. On 
one hand, there are individuals who distance themselves from their out-
group to associate themselves more closely with the ingroup (i.e., dominant 
group); on the other hand, there are individuals who distance themselves 
from both their outgroup and the ingroup. Professor Leong contends that 
the law should treat these two types of dissenters differently. 
In sum, this issue of the Chicago-Kent Law Review builds on existing 
scholarly explorations of intragroup dissent. This issue’s six articles and 
published keynote shed light on the dynamics of intragroup dissent as well 
as their legal implications. In doing so, these writings invite readers to re-
flect on how law and lawyering shape—and are shaped by—intragroup dis-
sent.
